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This paper analyzes the determinants of returns generated by European private equity funds. It 
starts from the presumption that this asset class is characterized by illiquidity, stickiness and 
segmentation. As a consequence, Gompers and Lerner (2000) have shown that venture deal 
valuations are driven by overall fund inflows into the industry giving way to the so called 
'money chasing deals' phenomenon. It is the aim of this paper to document that this 
phenomenon also explains a significant part of variation in private equity funds' returns. This 
is especially true for venture funds, as they are more affected by illiquidity and segmentation 
than buy-out funds. Actually, the paper presents a WLS-regression model that is able to 
explain up to 47% of variation in funds' returns. Apart from the importance of fund flows we 
can also show that market sentiment, the GPs' skills as well as the idiosyncratic risk of a fund 
have a significant impact on its returns. Moreover, they seem to be unrelated to stock market 
returns and negatively correlated with the development of the economy as a whole. According 
to a bootstrapping inference the results seem to be quite stable. 
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 1 Introduction
Private Equity has recently faced an increasing public awareness in Europe.
From an economic perspective the allegedly positive impact of venture capital
and private equity on economic growth is emphasized. From an asset man-
agement perspective it seems that private equity has become one of the most
important alternative asset classes. It can be shown, in fact, that institutional
investors1 have increased their share of wealth allocated to this asset class sub-
stantially. This is also conﬁrmed by the volume of capital raised by the private
equity industry. According to statistics provided by EVCA, this ﬁgure increased
from Euro 4.2bn in 1992 to over Euro 48bn in 2000. Of course, after the stock
market downturn starting in 2000 these cash inﬂows into the private equity in-
dustry decreased as well; however, even in 2002 about Euro 27bn have been
invested.2 Recently published ﬁgures indicate that institutional investors are
now going to increase their private equity portfolio ratio giving way to a more
optimistic outlook for the future of this industry.3
Despite this increasing importance of private equity as an asset class there’s
only a limited understanding of the economic characteristics of this industry. For
the time being, the literature can be split up into three diﬀerent strands: First,
the question whether private equity enhances economic growth is discussed.
Second, the informational advantages of allocating savings through the private
equity channel are analyzed. Third, the characteristics and determinants of
private equity returns are investigated.4 This paper aims to make a contribution
with respect to this last issue, where it is especially inﬂuenced by the papers of
Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Inderst and M¨ uller (2004), who emphasize the
impact of a speciﬁc competitive environment in the private equity industry.
In frictionless and perfectly competitive capital markets we would expect
returns on private equity fund investments to be determined by systematic risk
only. Neither personal skills of the management team, i.e. the general partner
(GP), nor the inﬂow of money into private equity funds should have an impact
on the performance of these funds. Due to the speciﬁc characteristics of the
private equity asset class, e.g. the illiquidity of the investment, the stickiness
of fund ﬂows, the restricted number of target companies and the segmentation
from other asset classes, the market may be far away from being frictionless
and perfectly competitive, at least in the short run. A very important ﬁnding
in this regard has been presented by Gompers and Lerner (2000), who show that
inﬂows into venture funds and target companies valuations correlate positively.
Although it is an open question, whether increased valuations are triggered by
money pouring into the private equity industry or whether this money ﬂow is
triggered by improved expectations with respect to future investment opportu-
nities, and hence by increased valuations, Gompers and Lerner (1999) present
1Banks are the largest source for private equity funds. In fact, 25.7% of total funds raised
in 1998-2002 stem from the banking industry. Pension funds contributed 23.1% and funds
raised from insurance companies were the third largest source at 12.7% of total funds raised.
Cf. European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) Yearbook 2003.
2Cf. EVCA Yearbook 2003.
3The European institutional investors want to increase their private equity portfolio ratio
from 1.1% to 3.2% within the next 5 years according to a survey recently published by the
consulting company Mackewicz.
4Cf. Gompers and Lerner (1999) for an extensive overview and Stefano and Stefano (2004)
for a Europe-focused discussion.
3some evidence that is more consistent with the ﬁrst explanation. They basically
argue that there is a limited number of favorable investments in the private
equity industry giving way to the so called ’money chasing deals’ phenomenon.
It is important to note in this regard that the soundness of this reasoning
is very much intertwined with the special features of the private equity asset
class, as has been shown in the context of an equilibrium analysis by Inderst
and M¨ uller (2004). Most importantly, due to the illiquidity of private equity
investments improved expectations with respect to future cash ﬂows generated in
this industry cannot directly be reﬂected in increasing asset prices, as it would be
the case for the public equity asset class. Hence, the additional money attracted
due to this improved economic prospects must entirely be absorbed on primary
markets, i.e. by an adjustment of deal pricing. This eﬀect will be reinforced,
if it is taken into account that the largest part of money invested in private
equity is allocated through private equity funds. In this regard, Ljungqvist and
Richardson (2003a) point out that private equity funds normally are segmented
from other asset classes and the capital ﬂows between GPs and LPs tend to
be sticky, i.e. it takes a longer time in order to adjust the capital invested in
the industry to changed expectations or valuations. Both mechanisms make it
diﬃcult to quickly redirect funds to other asset classes further reenforcing the
pressure on deal valuations in order to bring this segment of the capital market
in equilibrium.
If real-life private equity markets are governed in this way, we would expect
the realized returns of private equity funds to be aﬀected by total capital inﬂows
in the industry. More speciﬁcally, the ’money chasing deals’ phenomenon would
suggest that there should be a negative correlation between a fund’s performance
and the amount of savings directed towards the private equity industry. This
however would only be true to the extent that fund inﬂows are not matched by
an improvement in the economic perspectives of the ultimate target companies.
Hence, it is a major challenge of this paper to develop an approach able to test
this theory.
To sum up, this paper may extend the existing literature for the following
four reasons. First, using a dataset of 200 mature European private equity funds
over the period 1980 to 2003 provided by Thomson Venture Economics (TVE)
we are able to develop a regression model that explains more than 47% of vari-
ation in private equity returns. By doing so, we use a WLS-regression approach
as returns seem to be aﬀected by heteroscedasticity. Moreover, due to the small
size of the data set we use a bootstrap regression approach in order to check the
robustness of the results. Second, we propose a test for the ’money chasing deals’
phenomenon that basically relies on the fact the we make a distinction between
absolute and relative cash inﬂows into private equity funds. We can show that
for a given absolute fund inﬂow an increase in the allocation of money towards
a particular fund type has a signiﬁcant negative impact on the performance of
this fund type. Moreover, this eﬀect is very much stronger for venture funds
than for buy-out funds. This makes sense, as segmentation and stickiness might
be more present in the venture industry than in the buy-out industry. This ﬁnd-
ing strongly supports the ’money chasing deals’ phenomenon. Third, related to
this ﬁnding we present also evidence that investor sentiment matters. In fact,
funds closed in years with above average stock market conditions generate lower
returns. Fourth, in the context of our regression approach we ﬁnd returns to be
positively associated with some measures representing GP’s skills as well as with
4idiosyncratic risk. Compared with this, we ﬁnd no evidence that private equity
funds’ returns are correlated with stock market returns, while they even seem
to be negatively associated with the development of the economy as a whole.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we start with brieﬂy resuming
the literature and laying down the theoretical background for our tests. Section
3 describes the data set as well as some major issues in our methodology. In
section 4 we present the results. Section 5 summarizes the results and gives a
brief outlook.
2 Related Literature and Theoretical Consider-
ations
Due to the limited availability of return data there are only a few empirical
papers dealing with risk and return characteristics of the private equity industry.
Three important strands of empirical literature will be reported here. The ﬁrst
is concerned with estimating the return distribution on a private equity fund
investment. The second is focused on the question to what extent the returns are
determined by fund characteristics. The third rather small strand emphasizes
the relationship between fund performance and cash inﬂows into the industry.
2.1 The Private Equity Fund Return Distribution
As private equity investments are not traded on secondary markets, or, at least,
the pricing of such trades is not disclosed, we usually rely on the cash ﬂow
history of a fund investment in order to determine its return. For that purpose
either the IRR, the public market equivalent (PME), a proﬁtability index or a
multiple is used.5 Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003b) analyze cash ﬂow data
provided by one of the largest institutional investors in private equity in the US
between 1981 and 1993. They use the excess IRR with respect to a S&P 500
investment, to assess a fund’s proﬁtability. They document an outperformance
of ﬁve to eight percent per year on average.
Gottschalg, Phalippou, and Zollo (2004) analyze the return of a sample of
mature private equity funds on the basis of a proﬁtability index. In this context
they document an underperformance with respect to the stock market of up to
20 percent in terms of net present value. Kaplan and Schoar (2004) analyze
a data set from TVE which includes 746 funds of the years 1980 to 2001. By
using the public market equivalent (PME) approach they show that the average
funds’ returns are quite close to the S&P 500 returns. In fact, they found the
PMEs to be in a range from 0.96 to 1.05 on average.
As an alternative approach Cochrane (2004) focuses on the portfolio com-
pany level. Their performance is measured by using a dataset from Venture
One which consists of the data of the ﬁnancing rounds of 7.765 companies. Af-
ter adjusting his results for the survivorship bias, the author calculates mean
average returns to be equal to 59% with a standard deviation of 107%. Chen,
Baierl, and Kaplan (2002) examine 148 venture capital funds in the TVE data
set that have been liquidated before 1999. By assuming intermediate cash ﬂows
to be reinvested at the IRR they ﬁnd an annual average return of 45% with a
5A short deﬁnition of this methods is given in section 4.
5standard deviation of 115%. The results are quite similar to those of Cochrane
(2004), who uses the same reinvestment hypothesis.
Rouvinez (2003) proposes another cash ﬂow based approach. By assuming
that cash ﬂows are reinvested at a constant interest rate over time he is able
to derive a risk and return assessment for a set of more than hundred private
equity funds provided by the TVE data set. His results indicate a yearly average
return of 14.3% with a standard deviation of 34.4% for private equity funds with
a vintage year between 1980 and 1990. Weidig and Mathonet (2004) analyze
the risk proﬁles of direct investments in portfolio companies and investments in
private equity funds from 1980 to 1998 in detail. They conclude that there is
a diversiﬁcation beneﬁt for funds and funds-of-funds. The risk proﬁle of a fund
is relatively symmetric distributed and the probability of getting back less than
the capital invested is stated as 30%.
In contrast to these cash ﬂow based research papers, a few papers try to
assess the return of private equity funds on the basis of disclosed net asset
values. Timmons and Bygrave (1992) examine venture capital funds and ﬁnd
an average internal rate of return based on net asset values of 13.5% for the
years 1974-1989.6 It should be noted that relying on net asset values causes
a bias due to smoothing in book values. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2003)
derive an econometric time series model which considers return smoothing as
a result of illiquidity in investment portfolios. They show that under such a
smoothing process actual return variance and covariance might be higher than
derived on the basis of book value related returns. Emery (2003) transfers this
methodology to private equity investments and documents evidence of stale
pricing of private equity returns. The average annual return diﬀerence between
BO funds and the S&P 500 is 7.14% and the corresponding excess-return for
VC funds and the Nasdaq is 7.45% for the time period from 1986-2001.
A completely diﬀerent approach is used by Zimmermann, Bilo, Christophers,
and Degosciu (2004). They concentrate on a set of 229 publicy traded private
equity vehicles. Evidently, in this way a straightforward performance calcula-
tion applies. They document substantially larger Sharpe ratios of 1.5 for listed
private equity ﬁrms than for traditional asset classes. They calculate a positive
correlation between private equity and the MSCI World of 0.40 and the Global
Bond Index of 0.02.
2.2 Performance, Fund Inﬂows and Market Sentiment
Of course, the much more interesting question is how these returns are deter-
mined. In this section we focus on the question to what extent returns are
triggered by fund inﬂows into the private equity industry, i.e. we address the so
called ’money chasing deals’ phenomenon. In this context we will also discuss
whether market sentiment will have an impact on returns.
Gompers and Lerner (2000) argue that private equity is an asset class seg-
mented from other asset classes making the number of favorable investment
opportunities therefore limited. This is not a problem as long as the money
inﬂow into the industry corresponds with rationally formed expectations with
respect to the investment opportunities available in the universe of potential
6Thomson Venture Economics and EVCA report quarterly average IRRs based on net asset
values for the US and for Europe. EVCA reports a cumulative annualized IRR based on net
asset values of 10.1% for the period 1992-2002; cf. www.evca.com.
6target companies. However, to the extent that the increase in money inﬂow is
higher than the increase in both fundamental valuations of target companies
and the increase in the number and size of favorable investment targets a mis-
match of funds oﬀered and demanded will arise. Due to the illiquidity of the
private equity asset class this mismatch can turn out to be particularly harm-
ful. Improved expectations with respect to future cash ﬂows generated in this
industry cannot directly be reﬂected in increasing asset prices, as it would be
the case for the public equity asset class. Hence, the additional money attracted
due to this improved economic prospects must entirely be absorbed on primary
markets, i.e. by an adjustment of deal pricing.7 This eﬀect will be reinforced,
if it is taken into account that the largest part of money invested in private
equity is allocated through private equity funds. Hence, according to amount of
’excess’ capital pouring into the industry in a particular vintage year we would
expect increasing or decreasing valuations of target companies.8
In this regard, it should be taken into account that a large fraction of private
equity investments are allocated through private equity funds. For them the
segmentation argument might be especially important as they normally are not
allowed to invest the committed funds in any other asset class. Hence, even if
the GPs would be aware of an overvaluation in the industry they hardly would
be able to redirect their funds towards other investment projects. Moreover,
as Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003a) point out, capital ﬂows between GPs
and LPs tend to be sticky, i.e. it takes a longer time in order to adjust the
capital invested in the industry to changed expectations or valuations. Also
this second mechanisms makes it diﬃcult to quickly redirect funds to other asset
classes further reenforcing the pressure on deal valuations in order to bring this
segment of the capital market in equilibrium. It should be noted here that
this segmentation and stickiness argument may be more relevant for venture
funds than for buy-out funds. The latter have a much broader set of potential
investment targets including also public equity.
The hypothesis that capital inﬂows into the private equity industry increase
deal valuations has been corroborated in a seminal article of Gompers and Lerner
(2000). They analyze more than 4’000 venture ﬁnancing rounds of privately
held ﬁrms through the period 1987 to 1995. They show that the ﬁrm valuation
in a ﬁnancing round is the higher the more money poured into the venture
industry over the year before the deal was closed. This relationship is as robust
as perceivable in magnitude. However, although the authors integrated a lag
structure in their regression model they had to admit that on the basis of this
evidence one cannot make a ﬁnal decision as to whether higher valuations due
to better prospects cause higher inﬂows or wether higher inﬂows cause higher
valuations. Nevertheless, Gompers and Lerner (2000, p. 316 n.) argue in
favor of the second relationship, i.e. the ’money chasing deals’ phenomenon.
The most important evidence supporting their interpretation was the fact that
the performance of deals closed in ’hot’ periods, i.e. periods with relatively
7It should be noted, however, that secondary markets for private equity investments though
still rather small have grown rapidly over the last years. AltAssets estimates that cur-
rently 3 to 5% of yearly private equity investments are traded in secondary deals. Hence,
the degree of illiquidity of the private equity asset class is going to be reduced. Cf.
http://www.altassets.com/casefor/sectors/2002/nz3261.php.
8Inderst and M¨ uller (2004) show that this can, in fact, be the equilibrium outcome in a
model where the relative bargaining power of entrepreneurs and venture capitalist depends,
among other things, on the relative scarcity of venture capital.
7high inﬂows, was not better than the performance of deals closed during ’cold’
periods.
If the theory proposed by Gompers and Lerner (2000) is right we should be
able to detect similar relationships also for the returns of private equity funds.
However, things become a little bit more intriguing as in this case the invest-
ment behavior of private equity fund managers has to be taken into account as
well. In fact, Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003a) stress the importance of the
competitive environment faced by the GP. First, they argue that as far as the
competition for investment targets is concerned, GPs come under pressure the
less available are favorable targets for a given amount of capital supplied by
LPs. In fact, assuming that the number of companies founded in a particular
industry are a good proxy for the number of favorable targets, they can show
that the time to return a given multiple of committed capital to the LP be-
comes the longer the lower the number of newly founded companies is, i.e. the
tougher the competition for favorable investment projects among the GPs be-
comes. Second, Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003a) argue that the competition
for deals becomes the tougher the more money is pouring into private equity
funds holding the number of favorable investment targets constant. Accord-
ingly, they show that the time to return a given multiple of committed capital
becomes the longer the more higher the inﬂow of money into private equity
funds is. As the time to return a given fraction of money is negatively related
with the IRR, or also other return measures, their results could also be stated
as follows: The more money is pouring into the industry in a given vintage year,
the lower the return of funds closed in that particular vintage year. The better
the prospects of a particular industry, as measured by the number of newly
founded companies in that industry, the higher the returns of a private equity
fund investing in this industry. This ﬁndings are in accordance with the ’money
chasing deals’ phenomenon. However, in this paper we argue that the test for
the ’money chasing deals’ should be set up a slightly diﬀerent. Nevertheless,
also our results strongly support this relationship.
One additional aspect should be discussed in this regard. First, it is an open
question whether one regards the ’money chasing deals’ phenomenon as having
behavioral causes or as being a fully rational equilibrium outcome. It may
be that the overshooting of capital investments in the private equity industry
is due to some kind of herding behavior, where investment opportunities are
systematically over- or underestimated by investors. However, Ljungqvist and
Richardson (2003a, p. 4 n.) point out that it could also simply be a consequence
of the stickiness of private equity fund investments. Inderst and M¨ uller (2004)
argue that the supply of venture capital is related to entry cost and transparency
of the venture market. To some extent we will be able to present evidence in
favor of the behavioral based view. We can show that funds raised in vintage
years with above average stock market returns have lower returns. Similar
evidence has also been presented by Kaplan and Schoar (2004). This suggests
that beyond the mere liquidity driven eﬀects market sentiment might have an
impact on fund returns.9
9It should be noted that there is also a new strand in IPO literature relating the under-
pricing and long-run performance to market sentiment on the issued date; cf. among others
Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist (2004).
82.3 The impact of GPs’ Skills and Fund Characteristics
on Performance
It has been pointed out that the ’money chasing deals’ phenomenon is closely
related to the idea of illiquidity, segmentation, and stickiness of private equity
markets. From this it follows that the skills of the management team should
have a more signiﬁcant impact on fund returns than it is the case for funds
investing in public market securities. In eﬃcient public markets a great deal
of information, public or private, is incorporated in the asset prices. Hence,
the ultimate outcome of an investment strategy should be almost the same,
regardless whether the investor undertakes informational activities or not.10 In
fact, there is no clear evidence from mutual fund performance literature that
fund returns may be driven by fund managers skills, like selection and timing
abilities.11 Also, due to the lack of illiqudity and stickiness of public securities
markets there is yet no evidence that mutual fund returns are determined by
past fund inﬂows or by other factors driven by investor sentiment.12
Now, given the discussion presented above we would expect fund manage-
ment skills to be much more important in private equity funds than in public
mutual funds. Knowledge about investment opportunities in the private equity
industry may be distributed very unequally and, due to the lack of a contin-
uous market for this assets, it may take a long time until this information is
disseminated. The ﬁrst consequence of this idea is that deal returns should
have a much higher volatility than public stock market prices.13 Now, if among
diﬀerent management teams there is a systematic diﬀerence in knowledge about
private equity investment opportunities we would expect that good deals are
concentrated in a few fund portfolios, i.e. the portfolios of the skilled manage-
ment teams. In fact, it is well known - and it will once again be corroborated in
this paper - that private equity funds’ returns distributions are heavily skewed.
Finally, if skills are unequally distributed at a given point in time it may well
be that their distribution is not independent over time. Hence, we would ex-
pect the returns of subsequent funds run by the same management team to be
correlated. This gives way to the so called persistence phenomenon in private
equity funds’ returns. It has been documented by Kaplan and Schoar (2004),
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003a) or also Gottschalg, Phalippou, and Zollo
(2004). According to Kaplan and Schoar (2004) it is more pronounced for ven-
10Of course, in such a situation it would be individually rational not to undertake costly
information activities and rather behave as a free rider. This is what is called the Gross-
man/Stiglitz information paradoxon. The question then is, how does a society make sure that
public information is incorporated in asset prices.
11For instance, Henriksson (1984) found only weak evidence in favor of market timing abil-
ities of mutual fund managers, although his methodology has recently be subject to criticism;
cf. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ivkovich (2000). More generally, the evidence on performance
persistence in mutual funds indicates that this a short-run phenomenon, at the most. Cf.
in this regard Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) and, as a more recent article, Deaves
(2004). No evidence in favor of market timing abilities and only weak evidence in favor of
selection abilities has been found by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). Similar
results are also documented for closed-end funds; cf. Madura and Bers (2002). Short-term
persistence seems also to apply to real estate mutual funds; cf. Lin and Yung (2004).
12There is, however, evidence, that investors chase returns, i.e. mutual funds that have
been successful in the past attract additional money; cf. Deaves (2004). Evidence presented
by Madura and Bers (2002) on foreign closed-end funds is to some extent compatible with the
view that investor sentiment drives closed-end fund prices.
13This is conﬁrmed by the ﬁndings of Cochrane (2004).
9ture funds. If this story is true we expect superior performance to be caused
by superior selection abilities. We would, however, not expect to have them
caused by public market timing abilities, as information with respect to public
markets is very much more dispersed than information with respect to private
markets. This is exactly what we will ﬁnd in our study. There is persistence
in fund returns, but it seems not to be due to market timing abilities. This is
in contrast to the results presented by Nowak, Knigge, and Schmidt (2004) as
they ﬁnd clear support in favor of market timing abilities during the investment
phase of the fund.
As far as fund characteristics are concerned, Ljungqvist and Richardson
(2003b) ﬁnd that a fund’s excess IRR has an inverse U-shaped relationship with
fund size. However, contrary to what we would expect, they do not ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant relationship between a funds systematic or total risk and its excess
IRR. This is somehow puzzling. It should be noted that the explanatory power
of their regressions are quite low, as the adjusted R2 is in the range of 3 to 6
percent.
Gottschalg, Phalippou, and Zollo (2004) show that the proﬁtability index
of a VC-fund is unrelated to size, while for the BO-funds there is a positive
relationship. Moreover, performance seems to be positively related to the sys-
tematic risk of a fund. Finally, they show that performance is positively related
to economic growth and stock market returns during the lifetime of the fund.
Kaplan and Schoar (2004) document that funds’ IRRs are positively associated
with its size and with the stock market return.
3 Data
3.1 Preliminary Remarks
We use a dataset of European private equity funds that has been provided by
Thomson Venture Economics (TVE).14 It should be noted that TVE uses the
term private equity to describe the universe of all venture investing, buyout
investing and mezzanine investing.15 Actually, we have been provided with
various information related to the timing and size of cash ﬂows, residual net
asset values (NAV), fund size, vintage year, fund type, fund stage and liquidation
status for a total of 791 funds in over the period 1980-2003. Some 14 of these
funds have been funds of funds. We excluded these funds from our data set
as they combine a number of single private equity funds and, hence, provide
redundant information for the purpose of this study. Moreover, given the small
sample size it will not be possible to draw general conclusions with respect to
the performance of this particular fund type.
As far as the diﬀerent fund types and stages are concerned it should be noted
that we use the same deﬁnitions as TVE. A synopsis of these deﬁnitions can be
found in table 1.
14TVE is recording private equity data for ﬁve diﬀerent world regions. One of them is
Europe.
15Fund of fund investing and secondaries are also included in this broadest term. TVE is
not using the term to include angel investors or business angels, real estate investments or
other investing scenarios outside of the public market.
10Insert table 1
As one can see from Table 2, about 59% of the funds in our sample are
venture capital funds, while the remaining 41% are categorised as buyout funds.
The average fund size according to the TVE-data is Euro 182.75m.16 Variation
in fund size is considerably high, as the largest fund is 132 times as large as
the median fund. Moreover, as one might expect, buyout funds are on average
about 3.7 times as large as Venture capital funds. As far as the stage of the
sample funds is concerned, it can be seen that one quarter are early stage funds,
about one seventh are balanced funds and almost one ﬁfth are late stage funds.
As one may expect, the size of the funds diﬀers perceivably depending on their
stage.
Insert table 2
3.2 Increasing the Data Universe
Before presenting the results in the next section we have to deal with a problem
caused by the limited number of liquidated funds included in our data set. Table
2 shows that we have only 95 liquidated funds in our data set with an average age
of about 13 years. It could be argued that by looking at liquidated funds only a
selection bias might arise, for instance, because more recently closed funds had
a better performance on average.17 In order to mitigate this problem diﬀerent
approaches have been developed in the literature. Basically, their starting point
is the question whether it may be possible to infer future cash ﬂows of a fund
suﬃciently well on basis of its cash ﬂow history. If this is the case, it would
be possible to include also not yet liquidated funds in the cash ﬂow analysis
without incurring a systematic bias in the analysis. However, estimating future
cash ﬂows turns out to be a tricky issue.
Hence, in this paper we use an approach that does not rely on how to assess
future cash ﬂows of non liquidated funds. Instead we propose to treat those
funds as if they were liquidated that have a small net asset value relative to
their realized cash ﬂows. In such cases treating the current net asset value as
a ﬁnal cash ﬂow will have a minor impact on the IRR or some other return
measure used. From an economic perspective such funds can be deﬁned as
mature, as - from a cash ﬂow perspective - they have already seen most of their




16It should be noted that TVE is calculating the fund size on the basis of committed capital.
17In fact, tables 6 to 8 corroborate this view.
18A similar idea can be found in Meyer/Weidig (2003).
11Here, RNAVN stands for the residual net asset value of a fund at end of
period N.19 Of course, q is a parameter that has to be chosen in an arbitrary
way. In this study we will work with a q equal to 0.1 for one sample and 0.2 for
another, respectively. Hence, we add non-liquidated funds to our sample if their
residual value is not higher than 10% or 20%, respectively, of the undiscounted
sum of the absolute value of all previously accrued cash ﬂows. For these funds
the IRR is calculated under the assumption that the residual net asset value is
distributed by the end of our observation period.
The condition stated above can be simpliﬁed by taking into account that







Here TDt is the capital paid into the fund at time t, while Dt is the distribu-
tion paid by the fund at time t. Hence, in this way we disentangle draw downs





RV PIN = RNAVN PN
t=0 TDt
the initial condition stating which funds should be added to the data set can
be rewritten as follows:
1+DPIN
RV PIN ≥ 1
q
All funds that are not liquidated by 30 June 2003, and satisfying this condi-
tion for q=0.1 together with the liquidated funds are put in sample I, while all
funds satisfying this condition for q=0.2 together with all liquidated funds are
put into sample II. A short description of these three samples is given in table
3. As one can see, sample I consists of 200 funds, while sample II has 262 funds.
This is a perceivable increase given that we have only 95 liquidated funds.
Insert table 3
For a good part of our analysis we concentrate on the ’intermediate’ sample
I. A more detailed description of this sample can be found in table 4.
Insert table 4
19In principle, it would be better to use discounted cash ﬂows in the denominator rather
than undiscounted. However, we believe that this diﬀerence is not so important, given that it
can be taken into account by adjusting the parameter q. Therefore, we stick to the approach
presented here, as in this case the condition can be easily transformed into another very simple
condition.
124 Empirical Results
4.1 Return Distribution of European Private Equity Funds
In this section we present the results with respect to the return distribution
of European private equity funds. It should be noted here ﬁrst, that there
is an ongoing debate on how to measure the return distribution of an illiquid
investment. This is especially important if one is interested in asset allocation
decisions. As this paper is focused on the determinants of private equity returns
we do not emphasize this issue.20 However, as the shortcomings of the IRR are
well-known we use three alternative performance measures in our study: the
PME, the excess-IRR as well as the undiscounted payback period. The PME
is deﬁned as the ratio of the present value of all cash distributions over the
present value of all take-downs. Hereby, the year-by-year realized return on a
public market equity index is used as the discount rate. More precisely, the





i=t+1 (1 + RIi)
QT
t=1 (1 + RIt)
Here, RIt is the net return on the public equity index in period t, while cft
is the normalized distribution of the private equity fund in period t. Normalized
distributions are expressed as a fraction of the present value of all take-downs
where RIt is used as the discount rate. As we can only observe the returns on
a market index that are gross of management fees, we will make the following
correction in this study: For an equity index we assume management fees to
be equal to 50bp per year, while for a bond index these fees are assumed to be
equal to 20 bp. Hence, the net yearly return is equal the gross yearly return, as
indicated by the index performance, times 0.995 and times 0.998, respectively.
In this paper the MSCI Europe is used as an equity index and the JP Morgan
Government as a bond index.
The excess IRR is deﬁned as a fund’s IRR minus the return on a public
market index that can be achieved by investing at fund closing and selling at
the end of a fund’s lifetime. The payback counts the number of months it takes
before cumulated distributions equal cumulated take-downs. Of course, not all
funds in our sample ever reach their payback period. Hence, as far as reported
results include the payback period they refer to the subset of funds having a
ﬁnite payback period. As one can see from table 5 all four return measures
display a statistically highly signiﬁcant degree of correlation. This is especially
true as far as the IRR, the Excess-IRR, as well as the PME is concerned. For the
multivariate part of the presented analysis we will therefore mainly concentrate
on these three return measures.
Insert table 5
The private equity fund performance on the basis of the four diﬀerent perfor-
mance measures is resumed in tables 6 to 8. The average IRR of samples I and
20A more detailed discussion of this issue in the context of the data set used here can be
found in Kaserer and Diller (2004).
13II is perceivably higher than the IRR of the subsample consisting of liquidated
funds only. In fact, starting with an average IRR of 10% for the liquidated sam-
ple we reach an IRR of about 13% for sample I and 14% for sample II. These
ﬁgures are slightly lower than the results reported by Kaplan and Schoar (2004)
for the US-market, as they report an average IRR of 17%. Simultaneously, the
standard deviation of the IRRs increases signiﬁcantly when expanding the data
universe. Our method to include well performing as well as bad performing
funds in the sample, has a positive net eﬀect and drives the IRR upward. More-
over, we’d like to stress the highly skewed distribution of all the return measures
except the payback. This is in line with our presumption that unequally dis-
tributed skills and industry knowledge among the GPs should generate this kind
of return distribution. It also should be noted that the average payback in all
the three diﬀerent sub-samples is about 90 months or 7.5 to 7.8 years. This
ﬁgure is very close to the result of Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003b), who
document a payback period of slightly less than seven years.
Insert table 6 to 8
Table 7 reports the excess IRR of diﬀerent sub-samples. This excess return
is deﬁned as the IRR of a single fund minus the IRR of the MSCI Europe
index realized over the lifetime of the fund. Regardless of the benchmark and
the excess subsample the IRR is positive in most of the cases. Moreover, buy-
out funds seem to have consistently higher IRRs than venture capital funds.
Finally, table 8 gives the distribution of PMEs and BMEs for the three diﬀerent
subsamples as well as for diﬀerent fund types. The average PME is only larger
than one for sample II, while the value-weighted average is larger than one for
sample I and II. This is in contrast to the results derived for the Excess-IRR.
4.2 Performance, Fund Inﬂows and Market Sentiment
As explained in section 2.2 the basic idea of the ’money chasing deals’ phe-
nomenon is a mismatch of capital supplied and demanded in the private equity
industry. It has been pointed out that due to illiquidity, segmentation and
stickiness of private equity investments the market clearing mechanisms may
from time to time cause an over- or an undershooting of target companies’ as-
set prices. The basic empirical problem is that this mismatch cannot simply
be detected by just looking at the supply side, i.e. at capital inﬂows in the
private equity industry. One would have to know to what extent this inﬂows
are due to improved economic prospects in the industry and to what extent
they overshoot the demand. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003a) choose an ap-
proach were they rely on the assumption that investment opportunities in the
private equity industry, i.e. the demand side, are captured by the number of
companies founded. To the extent that private equity funds’ returns cannot be
explained by this variable, capital inﬂows should serve as a variable representing
the overshooting eﬀect. This might be somehow questionable. For instance, as
far as Europe is concerned, a strong correlation between the private equity fund
inﬂow and the number of IPOs can be detected. Moreover, both variables are
also highly correlated with the number of patent registrations. This can be seen
14in table 9. In our view, this is a strong indication that the inﬂow of capital
into the private equity industry is highly correlated with the general perception
of the investment opportunities in this industry. Hence, an increase in these
inﬂows should go along with an improvement in the economic outlook of the
private equity industry. Therefore, it may be more than questionable whether
this variable by itself is able to detect the ’money chasing deals’ phenomenon.
Insert table 9
This is why we follow a diﬀerent approach in our paper. In our view total
fund inﬂow is, basically, triggered by the economic prospects of the private
equity industry. However, in the short-run there might be a mismatch between
the funds that can be invested in new favorable investment projects and the
money pouring in the industry. Due to the stickiness of the private equity
market a ’money chasing deal’ phenomenon can arise, at least in the short run.
In order to test this idea empirically one would have to make an assessment of
the sign of this mismatch, at least. This is, of course, rather diﬃcult or even
impossible. However, a way to approach this problem would be the following: If
a mismatch between supply of capital and demand for investment funds arises,
its impact would be the harder the more the fund ﬂows are directed towards a
particular part of the private equity industry. So, if capital inﬂows increase by
10% and, by the same time, the share of early stage venture funds, later stage
venture funds, buy-out funds, etc., is the same as the year before, this supply
shock will be less harmful than in the case where the 10% increase has to be
swallowed by early stage funds alone. This is the more true, of course, the more
segmented the private equity industry is in itself. Given that funds often are
committed to invest only in ﬁrms of speciﬁc stages such a segmentation could,
in fact, arise.
So, our basic idea is that competition for valuable investment projects is
much more aﬀected, if additional money is unequally distributed between the
diﬀerent fund types. This is why we distinguish between the absolute fund inﬂow
in the private equity industry and the relative fund inﬂow, i.e. the allocation
of money between the venture capital and the buy-out funds. The former can
be regarded as a measure for the perception of investment opportunities while
the latter is a measure for the intensity of deal competition. According to the
’money chasing deals’ phenomenon we would expect the absolute inﬂow to have a
positive impact on fund returns, while the relative inﬂow should have a negative
impact. Moreover, it has already been emphasized that venture funds may be
more aﬀected by segmentation and stickiness than buy-out funds. Hence, we
expect an increase in the fraction of money directed towards venture fund to
have a stronger negative impact on returns than an increase in the fraction of
money directed towards buy-out funds.
This is exactly corroborated by the results of our regression analysis. Before
discussing the results it should be mentioned that we have chosen a WLS-
regression approach due to the existence of heteroscedasticity in our data set.
In fact, ﬁgure 1 reveals that IRR variance may be substantially higher for
small funds than for large funds. Actually, by applying a Levene-test the null-
hypothesis that residuals have equal variance has to be rejected on a 5% sig-




Regression speciﬁcations (1) to (3) in table 11 reveal that, as predicted, the
absolute fund inﬂow of a particular year has a positive impact on the return
of the funds closed in that particular year. This result still holds, even if we
use the change in the absolute fund inﬂow instead of the absolute money in-
ﬂow, as can be seen from regression speciﬁcations (4) to (6) in the same table.
The relative inﬂow, i.e. the share of capital that goes to that particular fund
type, has a negative impact on the fund’s returns, as predicted. Both eﬀects are
statistically highly signiﬁcant and do not change in diﬀerent regression speciﬁ-
cations. Moreover, in regression equations (2) and (5) we use the relative funds
allocated to venture funds only as an independent variable. Also in this case the
regression parameter is negative and highly signiﬁcant. If instead the relative
funds allocated to buy-out funds only are used as an independent variable we
got no signiﬁcant eﬀect.21 Hence, the change in the fraction of funds allocated
to a particular fund type has a clear impact on venture fund returns, while no
impact can be detected for buy-out funds. In our view, these ﬁndings strongly
corroborate the ’money chasing deals’ phenomenon.
It should be noted that we also ﬁnd a negative impact of the stock market
return in the vintage year of the fund on its ﬁnal return. Hence, we could say
that fund returns are the lower the better the market sentiment in the vintage
year is. This ﬁnding supports the idea that the over- or undershooting of capital
supply in the private equity industry might have a behavioral explanation.
Insert table 11 to 14
Tables 12 to 14 give the results for the same regression speciﬁcations used
in table 11 with the important diﬀerence, however, that the Excess-IRR or the
PME is used as dependent variable. As one can see, most of the results are
unchanged, at least as far as the sign and the signiﬁcance of the regression pa-
rameters are concerned. Finally, it should be noted that the regression approach
presented in tables 11 to 14 is able to explain up to 47% of cross-sectional vari-
ance of fund returns. This is a remarkable result supporting our conﬁdence in
the model that we proposed. Evidently, the ’money chasing deals’ phenomenon
accounts for a perceivable part of return variation in private equity funds. Ac-
cording to the VIFs the model is not aﬀected by a multicollinearity problem.
Moreover, all results seem to be robust, as the outcome of the bootstrap regres-
sion approach suggests. There, we did a random resampling of the data set by
making 200 independent draws with replacement. Then the WLS-regression was
recalculated for this new data set. These steps were repeated for 1’000 times.
21For simplicity, not all of the regression results are reported here.
16In this way we got a distribution for all the regression parameters allowing us to
calculate diﬀerent conﬁdence levels. The results are reported in tables 15 to 17.
As one can see, the diﬀerence in the regression parameter estimation is small in
size as well as with respect to signiﬁcance levels.
Insert table 15 to 17
4.3 The Impact of GPs’ Skills and Risk on Fund Perfor-
mance
As expected we also ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant evidence for persistence in fund
returns. The results suggest that an increase of 1 percentage point in the IRR of
the preceding fund leads to an increase of about 0.5 percentage points in the IRR
of the follow-on fund. As it has been explained, this results ﬁts nicely into the
picture of a sticky and segmented asset class. This is even more true, as we do
not ﬁnd market timing abilities to be accountable for persistent returns. In fact,
this is exactly what we would expect for a fund industry with sticky capital ﬂows.
It should be noted here that we use a market timing ability variable proposed by
Nowak, Knigge, and Schmidt (2004, p. 12 n.). This variable basically expresses
whether a GP tends to call a take-down during a phase of low market valuation.
One important question that is yet unanswered in the literature is to what
degree private equity returns can be explained by the stand alone risk and/or
systematic risk of the fund’s investment policy. As has been reported in section
2, results reported in the literature are quite inconclusive in this regard. To a
certain extent this may be due to the fact that it is rather unclear how riskiness
should be measured for an illiquid asset class. Here we propose two measures
of riskiness. First, the investment policy as deﬁned by the fund stage can be
regarded as a measure of the stand alone risk of a fund. As can be seen from
tables 11 to 14 we ﬁnd clear support that a riskier investment policy, character-
ized by the fund stage, leads to higher returns. For that purpose we deﬁned 5
diﬀerent stage categories, three for the venture funds and two for the buy-out
funds.22 These stages are assigned numbers from 0 to 4, where the highest risky
stage, i.e. early stage, got the number 0 and the stages with lowest risk, i.e.
private equity, got the number 4. As we can see from tables 11 to 14, there is a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in returns for the diﬀerent stages. The expectation of this
diﬀerence is between 2 and 3 percentage points for every stage tier. Hence, the
expected diﬀerence in the IRR between an early stage fund and a private equity
fund is in the range of 8 to 12 percentage points. This result is in accordance
with the model proposed by Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2002) showing that due to
principal-agent problems venture capital returns should be negatively aﬀected
by the amount of idiosyncratic risk.
As far as the stock market risk is concerned our evidence suggests that
private equity funds’ returns are not inﬂuenced by stock market returns. Hence,
it seems that this kind of systematic risk is not present in this asset class, or at
least cannot be detected in our model. What is even more surprising is the fact
22The stages for the venture funds are early stage, balanced/diversiﬁed, later stage. For the
buy-out funds we have the stage leveraged buy-out and private equity.
17that private equity returns are negatively correlated with the overall economic
development as measured by the GDP growth. Tables 11 to 14 document a
signiﬁcant negative impact of the economic growth over the lifetime of the fund
on the fund’s IRR, Excess-IRR or PME.23 Both results are puzzling and deserve
additional attention beyond the reach of this paper. Basically, the question is
whether this result is driven by the fact that the IRR is a biased return measure
or whether there is an economic logic behind this result. At a ﬁrst glance,
however, it supports the assertion that private equity is an asset class with low
market risk.
5 Conclusion
In this paper a comprehensive data set of European private equity funds pro-
vided by TVE was analyzed. Our main focus was to give new insights into
the determinants of funds’ returns. For that purpose we started from the pre-
sumption that this asset class is characterized by illiquidity, stickiness and seg-
mentation. It has been argued in theoretical and empirical papers that these
characteristics can cause an over- or undershooting of private equity asset prices,
at least in the short run. Most importantly, Gompers and Lerner (2000) have
shown that venture deal valuations are driven by overall fund inﬂows into the
industry giving way to the so called ’money chasing deals’ phenomenon. Also,
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003a) have shown that the investment behavior of
a GP depends on fund inﬂows into the industry. It was the aim of this paper to
document that this phenomenon also explains a signiﬁcant part of variation in
private equity funds’ returns. This is especially true for venture funds, as they
are more aﬀected by illiqudity and segmentation than buy-out funds. Actually,
the paper presents a WLS-regression model that is able to explain up to 47%
of variation in funds’ returns. Apart from the importance of fund ﬂows we can
also show that market sentiment, the GPs’ skills as well as the idiosyncratic risk
of a fund have a signiﬁcant impact on its returns. Moreover, they seem to be
unrelated to stock market returns and negatively correlated with the develop-
ment of the economy as a whole. According to a bootstrapping inference the
results seem to be quite stable.
23It should be noted here that the economic growth over lifetime variable is uncorrelated
with the lifetime MSCI return variable as well as with the lifetime private equity industry
inﬂows.
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20Table 1: Private equity funds’ type and stage deﬁnitions
Type deﬁnitions:
• Venture capital funds (VC): TVE uses the term to describe the universe
of venture investing. It does not include buyout investing, mezzanine in-
vesting, fund of fund investing or secondaries. Angel investors or business
angels are also not be included in the deﬁnition.
• Buyout funds (BO): TVE uses the term to describe the universe of buyout
investing and mezzanine investing. It does not include venture investing,
fund of fund investing or secondaries. Angel investors or business angels
are also not be included in the deﬁnition.
Stage deﬁnitions:
• Early Stage (ES): A fund investment strategy involving investment in
companies for product development and initial marketing, manufacturing
and sales activities. We included seed and start-up funds in this deﬁnition.
• Balanced/Diversiﬁed (B): A venture fund investment strategy that in-
cludes investment in portfolio companies at a variety of stages of develop-
ment (Seed, Early Stage, Diversiﬁed, Later Stage).
• Late Stage (LS): Development funds provide for the major growth ex-
pansion of a company whose sales volume is increasing. Although the
company has clearly made progress, it may not yet be showing a proﬁt.
The money invested is used to ﬁnance the initial development of the young
company. Later stage fund investment involves ﬁnancing the expansion
of a company which is producing, shipping and increasing its sales vol-
ume. In this deﬁnition, we included all the funds which stage is signed as
development(DEV), expansion(EX) and Late Stage (LS).
• Buyout (BO): TVE uses the term to describe the universe of buyout in-
vesting and mezzanine investing. It does not include venture investing,
fund of fund investing or secondaries. Angel investors or business an-
gels are also not be included in the deﬁnition. The deﬁnition involves
e.g. leverage buyouts (LBOs), management buyouts (MBOs) and bridge
ﬁnancing.
21Table 2: Characteristics of Total Funds Sample 1980-2003a
Type of Funds All Venture Capital Funds VC BO
Stage of Funds Early Stage Balanced Late Stage Total Total
# of Funds 777 197 116 143 456 321
in % 100.0% 25.4% 14.9% 18.4% 58.7% 41.3%
Size (EURm)
Average 182.75 70.89 144.13 60.50 86.26 319.81
Median 47.80 28.20 40.35 30.00 31.20 85.20
Stdev 513.04 122.55 435.79 109.38 243.66 722.35
All Liquidated Funds Non-liquidated Funds
# of Funds 777 95 682
in % 100.0% 12.2% 87.8%
Size (EURm)
Average 182.75 52.14 202.87
Median 47.80 26.20 53.10
Stdev 513.04 103.62 546.30
a The complete data set provided by Thomson Venture Economics (TVE) includes 777 Eu-
ropean private equity funds. TVE uses the term private equity to describe the universe of
all venture investing, buyout investing and mezzanine investing. In accordance with TVE
we use the following type deﬁnitions: Venture capital funds (VC) represent the universe of
venture investing. It does not include buyout investing, mezzanine investing, fund of fund
investing or secondaries. Angel investors or business angels are also not be included in the
deﬁnition. Buyout funds (BO) represent the universe of buyout investing and mezzanine
investing. Moreover, the following stage deﬁnitions are used: Early Stage (ES) is a fund
investment strategy involving investment in companies for product development and initial
marketing, manufacturing and sales activities. We included seed and start-up funds in this
deﬁnition. Balanced/Diversiﬁed (B)is a venture fund investment strategy that includes in-
vestment in portfolio companies at a variety of stages of development (Seed, Early Stage,
Diversiﬁed, Later Stage). Late Stage funds include development funds that provide for
the major growth expansion of a company whose sales volume is increasing. Later stage
fund investment also involves ﬁnancing the expansion of a company which is producing,
shipping and increasing its sales volume. Size is measured as total capital committed to a
fund.
Table 3: Number of Observations and Size in the Three Data Sets
Used
Liquidated Funds Sample I Sample II
Number of Observations
VC 47 99 131
BO 48 101 131
Total 95 200 262
Size in mio. Euro
Average 52.14 78.05 121.24
Median 26.20 33.10 39.10
Stdev 103.62 128.89 433.76
22Table 4: Characteristics of Funds in Sample I
Vintage Year N Sum Take-Downs Mean Multiple Mean Lifetime
1980 1 5.18 4.02 21.00
1981 4 79.34 1.88 15.00
1982 1 17.38 1.14 10.00
1983 4 66.78 1.64 16.75
1984 8 179.30 1.57 17.13
1985 17 414.66 1.42 13.82
1986 15 297.37 1.29 13.07
1987 19 1’506.52 1.68 13.74
1988 31 1’221.38 1.33 12.48
1989 25 2’161.84 2.57 12.64
1990 18 1’587.27 1.90 11.56
1991 15 552.84 1.68 11.13
1992 9 297.82 2.40 11.00
1993 8 670.00 2.29 8.13
1994 9 1’445.49 2.31 8.67
1995 3 606.96 1.49 8.00
1996 3 30.07 5.95 5.33
1997 6 677.22 1.63 5.50
1998 2 203.59 1.07 5.00
1999 1 37.26 2.04 4.00
2000 1 8.16 5.29 3.00
23Table 5: Coeﬃcient of correlation between four diﬀerent return
measures (Sample I, 200 funds)a
IRR Excess-IRR Payback
VC-Funds
PME Pearson Correlation Coeﬃcient 0.893*** 0.876*** -0.539***
Prob. (2-sided) 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 101 101 77
IRR Pearson Correlation Coeﬃcient 1 0.992*** -0.618***
Prob. (2-sided) 0.000 0.000
N 101 77




PME Pearson Correlation Coeﬃcient 0.900*** 0.892*** -0.696***
Prob. (2-sided) 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 99 99 80
IRR Pearson Correlation Coeﬃcient 1 0.983*** -0.643***
Prob. (2-sided) 0.000 0.000
N 99 80




PME Pearson Correlation Coeﬃcient 0.873*** 0.862*** -0.500***
Prob. (2-sided) 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 200 200 157
IRR Pearson Correlation Coeﬃcient 1 0.989*** -0.594***
Prob. (2-sided) 0.000 0.000
N 200 157
Excess-IRR Pearson Correlation Coeﬃcient 1 -0.610***
Prob. (2-sided) 0.000
N 157
***Coeﬃcient of correlation is signiﬁcant at the 1%-level, at least.
a The PME is the ratio of the present value of all cash distributions over the present
value of all take-downs. Hereby, the year-by-year realized return on the MSCI Europe
is used as the discount rate. In order to take into account management fees of a public
equity investment we multiplied the yearly realized index return with 0.995; i.e. we
assumed management fees of a public equity investment to be equal to 50bp per year.
The IRR is the discount rate making the present value of all distributions equal to the
present value of all take-downs. The payback counts the number of months it takes
before cumulated distributions equal cumulated take-downs. Of course, not all funds
in our sample have a payback period. Reported correlation coeﬃcients, hence, refer
to a subset of funds having a ﬁnite payback period.
24Table 6: Distribution of IRR and payback period for diﬀerent
fund typesa
IRR and Payback IRR(CF) Payback in months
VC BO Total VC BO Total
Liquidated Funds
Average 7.32% 12.64% 10.01% 108.53 83.63 94.62
Median 4.77% 9.79% 7.28% 110.00 84.50 95.50
75th Percentile 12.98% 18.67% 14.24% 143.50 113.75 120.50
25th Percentile -4.00% 8.23% 0.00% 87.50 62.25 66.50
Min -12.12% -13.66% -13.66% 32.00 21.00 21.00
Max 103.73% 88.05% 103.73% 215.00 139.00 215.00
Stdev 17.82% 17.67% 17.85% 41.38 33.61 38.99
Sample I
Average 12.00% 13.39% 12.69% 102.79 78.38 90.35
Median 8.05% 10.80% 9.14% 104.00 70.00 90.00
75th Percentile 15.65% 18.76% 17.13% 127.50 106.75 118.50
25th Percentile 1.90% 9.00% 4.45% 74.50 54.25 61.50
Min -13.56% -13.66% -13.66% 16.00 20.00 16.00
Max 153.91% 88.05% 153.91% 215.00 169.00 215.00
Stdev 22.06% 16.18% 19.34% 41.90 33.94 39.86
Sample II
Average 12.50% 15.63% 14.07% 99.58 81.48 90.09
Median 7.40% 11.00% 9.56% 96.50 71.00 84.00
75th Percentile 16.31% 19.95% 18.17% 127.00 108.75 118.00
25th Percentile 0.00% 1.69% 0.05% 69.50 54.25 60.75
Min -13.56% -13.66% -13.66% 16.00 18.00 16.00
Max 181.90% 133.25% 181.90% 215.00 200.00 215.00
Stdev 24.95% 20.59% 22.89% 42.84 37.35 40.97
a The IRR is the discount rate making the present value of all distributions equal to
the present value of all take-downs. The payback counts the number of months it
takes before cumulated distributions equal cumulated take-downs. Of course, not all
funds in our sample have a payback period. Reported correlation coeﬃcients, hence,
refer to a subset of funds having a ﬁnite payback period.
25Table 7: Excess-IRR of private equity funds with
respect to MSCI Europea
Excess-IRR of MSCI Europe VC BO Total
Liquidated Funds
Average -2.27% 3.37% 0.58%
Median -4.17% -0.77% -2.70%
75th Percentile 1.76% 9.47% 5.21%
25th Percentile -10.84% -7.08% -9.21%
Min -22.24% -24.00% -24.00%
Max 90.99% 84.13% 90.99%
Stdev 17.41% 19.14% 18.42%
Number of Ob. 47 48 95
Sample I
Average 3.62% 5.29% 4.45%
Median -1.37% 1.57% 0.61%
75th Percentile 5.94% 12.56% 10.24%
25th Percentile -8.02% -6.17% -7.32%
Min -22.24% -24.00% -24.00%
Max 169.35% 84.13% 169.35%
Stdev 24.27% 17.16% 21.01%
Number of Ob. 101 99 200
Sample II
Average 5.10% 8.25% 6.68%
Median 0.64% 3.53% 1.71%
75th Percentile 8.22% 12.87% 11.23%
25th Percentile -6.99% -5.04% -5.92%
Min -22.24% -20.00% -22.24%
Max 176,0% 127.00% 176.00%
Stdev 25.07% 20.63% 22.96%
Number of Ob. 131 131 262
a The excess IRR is deﬁned as a fund’s IRR minus the return on
the MSCI Europe equity index that can be achieved by investing
at fund closing and selling at the end of a fund’s lifetime.
26Table 8: PME and BME of Private Equity Funds by
Sample Deﬁnitionsa
PME BME
VC BO Total VC BO Total
Liquidated Funds
Average 0.82 0.90 0.86 1.11 1.07 1.09
Median 0.68 0.89 0.80 0.81 1.09 0.99
75th Percentile 0.97 1.24 1.10 1.38 1.37 1.38
25th Percentile 0.33 0.51 0.42 0,54 0.64 0.58
Min 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.07
Max 6.97 2.79 6.97 10.45 2.95 10.45
Stdev 1.01 0.53 0.81 1.51 0.60 1.14
Value-weighted 0.94 1.21
Sample I
Average 0.98 0.94 0.96 1.14 1.24 1.20
Median 0.75 0.86 0.82 1.06 1.02 1.03
75th Percentile 1.17 1.24 1.23 1.44 1.43 1.43
25th Percentile 0.40 0.59 0.51 0.66 0.63 0.66
Min 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.02
Max 6.97 2.79 6.97 10.45 2.95 10.45
Stdev 1.15 0.51 0.89 1.02 0.59 1.11
Value-weighted 1.04 1.27
Sample II
Average 1.01 1.06 1.03 1.25 1.21 1.23
Median 0.76 0.92 0.85 0.99 1.13 1.07
75th Percentile 1.22 1.35 1.27 1.27 1.42 1.45
25th Percentile 0.44 0.61 0.55 0.60 0.77 0.66
Min 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.02
Max 7.27 4.61 7.27 10.45 5.27 10.45
Stdev 1.15 0.70 0.95 1.38 0.74 1.10
Value-weighted 1.16 1.30
a The PME is the ratio of the present value of all cash distributions over
the present value of all take-downs. Hereby, the year-by-year realized
return on the MSCI Europe is used as the discount rate. In order
to take into account management fees of a public equity investment
we multiplied the yearly realized index return with 0.995; i.e. we
assumed management fees of a public equity investment to be equal
to 50bp per year. The BME is deﬁned in the same way as the PME
with the diﬀerence that the JP Morgan Government bond index is
used to determine the discount rates. In order to take into account
management fees of a public bond investment we multiplied the yearly
realized index return with 0.998; i.e. we assumed management fees of





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Figure 1: Squared residuals plotted against size variable (Sample I,
200 Funds)
Unstandardaized residuals used in this plot where obtained from estimating equation (1) in table ??.
Table 10: Levene-test on variance diﬀerence of resid-
ual deciles (Sample I, 200 Funds)a
Levene
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
Unstandardized based on mean 2,024 9 180 0,039
residuals based on median 1,571 9 180 0,127
a Residuals used in this test where obtained from estimating equation
(1) in table ??. The null hypothesis in the Levene-test is that the
variance of k groups formed by the unstandardized residuals are all
equal. As can be seen, in the mean-based test the null hypothesis has
to be rejected at a 5%-level.
29T
a
b
l
e
1
1
:
W
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
o
n
f
u
n
d
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
:
I
R
R
a
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
S
a
m
p
l
e
I
,
2
0
0
F
u
n
d
s
)
a
S
a
m
p
l
e
I
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
I
R
R
(
1
)
V
I
F
(
2
)
V
I
F
(
3
)
V
I
F
(
4
)
V
I
F
(
5
)
V
I
F
(
6
)
V
I
F
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
0
.
8
7
5
0
.
7
2
2
0
.
6
9
7
1
.
3
2
7
1
.
1
2
1
0
.
9
4
8
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
S
t
a
g
e
-
0
.
0
3
2
1
.
9
3
0
-
0
.
0
3
4
3
.
4
0
9
-
0
.
0
2
4
2
.
0
0
1
-
0
.
0
4
6
1
.
8
5
8
-
0
.
0
5
1
3
.
2
8
0
-
0
.
0
3
2
2
.
0
9
1
(
0
.
0
1
1
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
4
0
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
3
9
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
4
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
1
4
)
*
*
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
p
.
y
.
0
.
1
1
0
1
.
2
2
1
0
.
1
1
3
1
.
2
3
4
-
0
.
0
5
7
1
.
2
7
4
0
.
0
0
9
1
.
1
5
6
0
.
0
1
6
1
.
1
7
9
-
0
.
1
0
1
1
.
1
7
5
(
0
.
1
4
2
)
(
0
.
1
4
3
)
(
0
.
4
7
2
)
(
0
.
9
0
9
)
(
0
.
8
4
6
)
(
0
.
2
1
1
)
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
V
Y
-
0
.
1
0
4
1
.
1
5
1
-
0
.
1
0
0
1
.
1
5
2
-
0
.
0
8
1
1
.
1
5
9
-
0
.
1
3
9
1
.
1
6
7
-
0
.
1
3
1
1
.
1
6
6
-
0
.
0
8
7
1
.
2
0
9
(
0
.
0
4
4
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
5
9
)
*
(
0
.
1
1
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
9
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
1
6
)
*
*
(
0
.
1
0
1
)
G
D
P
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
p
.
y
.
-
0
.
2
3
1
1
.
0
2
4
-
0
.
2
2
7
1
.
0
2
4
-
0
.
1
5
4
1
.
0
3
2
-
0
.
3
1
9
1
.
0
9
6
-
0
.
3
1
2
1
.
0
9
6
-
0
.
2
0
8
1
.
2
0
7
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
7
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
*
*
*
I
R
R
o
f
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
0
0
.
4
5
9
1
.
0
2
7
0
.
3
8
5
1
.
0
3
7
0
.
5
1
1
1
.
0
3
6
0
.
4
2
5
1
.
0
3
2
0
.
3
7
2
1
.
0
4
6
0
.
5
0
5
1
.
0
4
2
(
0
.
0
2
8
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
7
1
)
*
(
0
.
0
0
9
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
4
4
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
8
7
)
*
(
0
.
0
1
2
)
*
*
V
C
f
u
n
d
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
-
0
.
1
5
9
3
.
2
6
3
-
0
.
1
9
0
3
.
1
7
5
(
0
.
0
1
7
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
7
)
*
*
*
F
u
n
d
T
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
-
0
.
4
0
8
1
.
8
4
1
-
0
.
3
1
8
2
.
0
0
7
-
0
.
5
1
9
1
.
7
7
6
-
0
.
3
5
2
2
.
0
0
6
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
5
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
9
)
*
*
*
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
0
.
0
6
6
1
.
1
2
9
0
.
0
6
3
1
.
1
3
8
0
.
0
3
7
1
.
2
2
1
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
3
)
*
*
*
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
c
e
0
.
1
2
7
1
.
1
0
8
0
.
1
1
9
1
.
1
0
0
0
.
0
5
8
1
.
3
2
5
o
f
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
5
2
)
*
T
i
m
i
n
g
T
a
k
e
D
o
w
n
s
3
6
m
t
h
s
-
0
.
0
2
9
1
.
0
6
8
-
0
.
0
2
8
1
.
0
7
1
(
0
.
1
9
0
)
(
0
.
2
3
0
)
N
1
9
0
1
9
0
1
5
8
1
8
2
1
8
2
1
5
2
A
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
R
2
0
.
3
9
1
0
.
3
6
4
0
.
1
6
6
0
.
3
4
4
0
.
3
1
0
0
.
1
4
3
S
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
P
o
w
e
r
V
a
l
u
e
-
0
.
1
0
0
-
0
.
1
0
0
0
.
1
0
0
-
0
.
2
0
0
-
0
.
2
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
L
o
g
-
l
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
9
5
.
7
7
6
9
1
.
7
7
5
1
0
5
.
2
4
2
8
6
.
4
6
5
8
1
.
9
4
0
9
6
.
7
6
1
a
A
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
w
e
u
s
e
t
h
e
I
R
R
,
a
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
t
e
x
t
.
S
t
a
g
e
i
s
a
n
o
r
d
i
n
a
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
w
h
e
r
e
w
e
a
s
s
i
g
n
e
d
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
t
o
f
u
n
d
s
w
i
t
h
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
t
s
t
a
g
e
f
o
c
u
s
:
E
a
r
l
y
S
t
a
g
e
=
0
,
B
a
l
a
n
c
e
d
/
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
ﬁ
e
d
=
1
,
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
/
L
a
t
e
S
t
a
g
e
=
2
,
L
B
O
=
3
a
n
d
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
E
q
u
i
t
y
=
4
.
W
e
a
s
s
u
m
e
t
h
e
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
p
o
l
i
c
y
o
f
a
f
u
n
d
t
o
b
e
t
h
e
r
i
s
k
i
e
r
t
h
e
l
o
w
e
r
t
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
h
i
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
p
.
y
.
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
r
e
t
u
r
n
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
V
Y
i
s
t
h
e
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
.
G
D
P
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
p
.
y
.
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
g
r
o
w
t
h
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
.
I
R
R
o
f
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
0
i
s
t
h
e
I
R
R
o
f
t
h
e
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
o
n
e
e
x
i
s
t
s
,
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
i
t
i
s
s
e
t
t
o
z
e
r
o
.
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
.
V
C
f
u
n
d
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
i
t
i
s
z
e
r
o
.
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
a
r
e
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
.
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
c
e
o
f
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
o
f
t
h
e
V
i
n
t
a
g
e
Y
e
a
r
a
n
d
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
.
T
i
m
i
n
g
T
a
k
e
D
o
w
n
s
3
6
m
t
h
s
i
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
t
o
t
h
e
d
e
ﬁ
n
i
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
b
y
N
o
w
a
k
,
K
n
i
g
g
e
,
a
n
d
S
c
h
m
i
d
t
(
2
0
0
4
,
p
.
1
2
n
.
)
.
T
h
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
s
u
p
p
o
s
e
d
t
o
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
t
h
e
t
i
m
i
n
g
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
.
T
h
e
w
e
i
g
h
t
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
t
o
e
a
c
h
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
S
i
z
e
P
o
w
e
r
V
a
l
u
e
.
W
e
u
s
e
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
t
o
d
e
n
o
t
e
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
1
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
0
%
l
e
v
e
l
(
t
w
o
-
s
i
d
e
d
)
.
30T
a
b
l
e
1
2
:
W
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
o
n
f
u
n
d
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
:
E
x
c
e
s
s
-
I
R
R
a
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
S
a
m
p
l
e
I
,
2
0
0
F
u
n
d
s
)
a
S
a
m
p
l
e
I
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
E
x
c
e
s
s
-
I
R
R
(
1
)
V
I
F
(
2
)
V
I
F
(
3
)
V
I
F
(
4
)
V
I
F
(
5
)
V
I
F
(
6
)
V
I
F
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
0
.
7
5
8
0
.
6
1
2
0
.
5
5
2
1
.
3
0
6
1
.
1
0
2
0
.
9
6
9
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
1
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
S
t
a
g
e
-
0
.
0
2
7
1
.
8
9
4
-
0
.
0
3
1
3
.
3
1
1
-
0
.
0
2
3
1
.
9
6
6
-
0
.
0
4
8
1
.
7
8
8
-
0
.
0
5
7
3
.
0
9
4
-
0
.
0
3
8
2
.
0
1
6
(
0
.
0
2
7
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
6
4
)
*
(
0
.
0
5
3
)
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
1
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
4
)
*
*
*
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
p
.
y
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
V
Y
-
0
.
0
8
6
1
.
0
5
1
-
0
.
0
8
1
1
.
0
5
0
-
0
.
0
9
8
1
.
0
6
9
-
0
.
1
5
3
1
.
0
5
3
-
0
.
1
4
4
1
.
0
4
9
-
0
.
1
2
2
1
.
1
1
3
(
0
.
0
8
4
)
*
(
0
.
1
0
9
)
(
0
.
0
5
0
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
3
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
6
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
2
2
)
*
*
G
D
P
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
p
.
y
.
-
0
.
2
2
0
1
.
0
1
7
-
0
.
2
1
5
1
.
0
1
8
-
0
.
1
5
0
1
.
0
1
8
-
0
.
3
3
7
1
.
0
8
2
-
0
.
3
2
9
1
.
0
8
3
-
0
.
2
4
9
1
.
1
5
0
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
1
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
I
R
R
o
f
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
0
0
.
4
3
2
1
.
0
2
7
0
.
3
5
9
1
.
0
3
7
0
.
4
9
6
1
.
0
3
5
0
.
3
8
3
1
.
0
3
2
0
.
3
2
1
1
.
0
4
5
0
.
4
5
6
1
.
0
4
0
(
0
.
0
4
0
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
9
5
)
*
(
0
.
0
1
2
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
7
4
)
*
(
0
.
1
4
4
)
(
0
.
0
2
7
)
*
*
V
C
f
u
n
d
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
-
0
.
1
5
8
3
.
2
1
1
-
0
.
2
1
6
3
.
0
8
2
(
0
.
0
1
7
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
*
*
*
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
-
0
.
3
9
7
1
.
8
3
1
-
0
.
3
2
5
1
.
9
8
6
-
0
.
5
4
2
1
.
7
5
9
-
0
.
3
8
3
1
.
9
9
7
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
5
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
6
)
*
*
*
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
0
.
0
7
9
1
.
0
3
5
0
.
0
7
6
1
.
0
5
5
0
.
0
5
6
1
.
0
6
4
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
c
e
0
.
1
5
9
1
.
0
8
1
0
.
1
5
0
1
.
0
7
9
0
.
1
0
3
1
.
2
7
2
o
f
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
1
)
*
*
*
T
i
m
i
n
g
T
a
k
e
D
o
w
n
s
3
6
m
t
h
s
-
0
.
0
3
0
1
.
0
6
2
-
0
.
0
2
5
1
.
0
6
0
(
0
.
1
8
5
)
(
0
.
2
9
8
)
N
1
9
0
1
9
0
1
5
8
1
8
2
1
8
2
1
5
2
A
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
R
2
0
.
4
7
0
0
.
4
5
0
0
.
2
0
9
0
.
4
1
6
0
.
3
9
0
0
.
1
5
9
S
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
P
o
w
e
r
V
a
l
u
e
-
0
.
1
0
0
-
0
.
1
0
0
0
.
1
0
0
-
0
.
2
0
0
-
0
.
2
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
L
o
g
-
l
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
9
3
.
6
0
7
9
0
.
0
6
6
1
0
1
.
7
8
9
8
2
.
8
9
6
7
8
.
9
5
5
9
1
.
3
8
3
a
A
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
w
e
u
s
e
t
h
e
E
x
c
e
s
s
-
I
R
R
,
a
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
t
e
x
t
.
S
t
a
g
e
i
s
a
n
o
r
d
i
n
a
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
w
h
e
r
e
w
e
a
s
s
i
g
n
e
d
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
t
o
f
u
n
d
s
w
i
t
h
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
t
s
t
a
g
e
f
o
c
u
s
:
E
a
r
l
y
S
t
a
g
e
=
0
,
B
a
l
a
n
c
e
d
/
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
ﬁ
e
d
=
1
,
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
/
L
a
t
e
S
t
a
g
e
=
2
,
L
B
O
=
3
a
n
d
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
E
q
u
i
t
y
=
4
.
W
e
a
s
s
u
m
e
t
h
e
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
p
o
l
i
c
y
o
f
a
f
u
n
d
t
o
b
e
t
h
e
r
i
s
k
i
e
r
t
h
e
l
o
w
e
r
t
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
h
i
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
p
.
y
.
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
r
e
t
u
r
n
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
V
Y
i
s
t
h
e
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
.
G
D
P
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
p
.
y
.
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
g
r
o
w
t
h
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
.
I
R
R
o
f
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
0
i
s
t
h
e
I
R
R
o
f
t
h
e
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
o
n
e
e
x
i
s
t
s
,
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
i
t
i
s
s
e
t
t
o
z
e
r
o
.
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
.
V
C
f
u
n
d
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
i
t
i
s
z
e
r
o
.
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
a
r
e
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
.
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
c
e
o
f
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
o
f
t
h
e
V
i
n
t
a
g
e
Y
e
a
r
a
n
d
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
.
T
i
m
i
n
g
T
a
k
e
D
o
w
n
s
3
6
m
t
h
s
i
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
t
o
t
h
e
d
e
ﬁ
n
i
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
b
y
N
o
w
a
k
,
K
n
i
g
g
e
,
a
n
d
S
c
h
m
i
d
t
(
2
0
0
4
,
p
.
1
2
n
.
)
.
T
h
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
s
u
p
p
o
s
e
d
t
o
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
t
h
e
t
i
m
i
n
g
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
.
T
h
e
w
e
i
g
h
t
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
t
o
e
a
c
h
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
S
i
z
e
P
o
w
e
r
V
a
l
u
e
.
W
e
u
s
e
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
t
o
d
e
n
o
t
e
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
1
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
0
%
l
e
v
e
l
(
t
w
o
-
s
i
d
e
d
)
.
31T
a
b
l
e
1
3
:
W
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
o
n
f
u
n
d
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
:
P
M
E
a
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
S
a
m
p
l
e
I
,
2
0
0
F
u
n
d
s
)
a
S
a
m
p
l
e
I
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
P
M
E
(
1
)
V
I
F
(
2
)
V
I
F
(
3
)
V
I
F
(
4
)
V
I
F
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
3
.
2
4
6
2
.
5
9
5
3
.
3
3
3
3
.
2
4
5
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
S
t
a
g
e
-
0
.
1
1
4
1
.
8
6
8
-
0
.
0
8
6
3
.
6
0
9
-
0
.
0
9
8
1
.
9
7
0
-
0
.
1
1
6
1
.
8
9
3
(
0
.
0
4
1
)
*
*
(
0
.
2
7
7
)
(
0
.
0
2
4
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
4
1
)
*
*
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
p
.
y
.
0
.
0
6
0
1
.
2
4
9
(
0
.
8
6
9
)
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
V
Y
-
0
.
2
8
6
1
.
0
4
7
-
0
.
2
3
7
1
.
0
3
9
-
0
.
2
5
0
1
.
0
6
2
-
0
.
2
9
6
1
.
1
3
1
(
0
.
1
7
2
)
(
0
.
2
6
2
)
(
0
.
1
5
6
)
(
0
.
1
7
5
)
G
D
P
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
p
.
y
.
-
0
.
5
9
8
1
.
0
2
5
-
0
.
5
9
6
1
.
0
2
8
-
0
.
6
9
7
1
.
0
2
7
-
0
.
6
0
4
1
.
0
4
2
(
0
.
0
3
2
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
3
5
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
1
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
3
2
)
*
*
P
M
E
o
f
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
0
0
.
0
9
9
1
.
0
3
2
0
.
0
7
8
1
.
0
3
9
0
.
0
8
5
1
.
0
4
9
0
.
0
9
9
1
.
0
3
2
(
0
.
4
0
1
)
(
0
.
5
1
8
)
(
0
.
3
8
5
)
(
0
.
4
0
3
)
V
C
f
u
n
d
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
0
.
1
6
7
3
.
5
5
5
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
F
u
n
d
T
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
-
1
.
4
3
5
1
.
8
4
5
-
1
.
0
3
7
2
.
0
0
0
-
1
.
4
4
1
1
.
8
5
2
(
0
.
0
0
9
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
1
3
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
9
)
*
*
*
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
0
.
1
8
1
1
.
0
3
1
-
0
.
3
2
4
1
.
0
5
6
0
.
1
1
3
1
.
0
6
3
0
.
1
8
3
1
.
1
9
1
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
3
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
6
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
c
e
o
f
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
T
i
m
i
n
g
T
a
k
e
D
o
w
n
s
3
6
m
t
h
s
-
0
.
0
7
9
1
.
0
7
0
(
0
.
3
3
3
)
N
1
9
0
1
9
0
1
5
8
1
8
2
A
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
R
2
0
.
1
4
7
0
.
1
1
9
0
.
1
1
2
0
.
1
4
2
S
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
0
P
o
w
e
r
V
a
l
u
e
-
0
.
5
0
0
-
0
.
5
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
-
0
.
5
0
0
L
o
g
-
l
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
-
2
0
3
.
4
3
5
-
2
0
6
.
4
4
7
-
9
9
.
7
1
9
-
2
0
3
.
4
4
1
a
A
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
w
e
u
s
e
t
h
e
P
M
E
,
a
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
t
e
x
t
.
S
t
a
g
e
i
s
a
n
o
r
d
i
n
a
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
w
h
e
r
e
w
e
a
s
s
i
g
n
e
d
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
t
o
f
u
n
d
s
w
i
t
h
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
t
s
t
a
g
e
f
o
c
u
s
:
E
a
r
l
y
S
t
a
g
e
=
0
,
B
a
l
a
n
c
e
d
/
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
ﬁ
e
d
=
1
,
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
/
L
a
t
e
S
t
a
g
e
=
2
,
L
B
O
=
3
a
n
d
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
E
q
u
i
t
y
=
4
.
W
e
a
s
s
u
m
e
t
h
e
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
p
o
l
i
c
y
o
f
a
f
u
n
d
t
o
b
e
t
h
e
r
i
s
k
i
e
r
t
h
e
l
o
w
e
r
t
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
h
i
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
p
.
y
.
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
r
e
t
u
r
n
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
V
Y
i
s
t
h
e
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
.
G
D
P
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
p
.
y
.
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
g
r
o
w
t
h
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
.
P
M
E
o
f
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
0
i
s
t
h
e
P
M
E
o
f
t
h
e
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
o
n
e
e
x
i
s
t
s
,
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
i
t
i
s
s
e
t
t
o
z
e
r
o
.
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
.
V
C
f
u
n
d
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
i
t
i
s
z
e
r
o
.
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
a
r
e
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
.
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
c
e
o
f
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
o
f
t
h
e
V
i
n
t
a
g
e
Y
e
a
r
a
n
d
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
.
T
i
m
i
n
g
T
a
k
e
D
o
w
n
s
3
6
m
t
h
s
i
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
t
o
t
h
e
d
e
ﬁ
n
i
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
b
y
N
o
w
a
k
,
K
n
i
g
g
e
,
a
n
d
S
c
h
m
i
d
t
(
2
0
0
4
,
p
.
1
2
n
.
)
.
T
h
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
s
u
p
p
o
s
e
d
t
o
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
t
h
e
t
i
m
i
n
g
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
.
T
h
e
w
e
i
g
h
t
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
t
o
e
a
c
h
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
S
i
z
e
P
o
w
e
r
V
a
l
u
e
.
W
e
u
s
e
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
t
o
d
e
n
o
t
e
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
1
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
0
%
l
e
v
e
l
(
t
w
o
-
s
i
d
e
d
)
.
32T
a
b
l
e
1
4
:
W
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
o
n
f
u
n
d
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
(
I
I
)
-
P
M
E
a
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
S
a
m
p
l
e
I
,
2
0
0
F
u
n
d
s
)
a
S
a
m
p
l
e
I
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
P
M
E
(
5
)
V
I
F
(
6
)
V
I
F
(
7
)
V
I
F
(
8
)
V
I
F
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
4
.
5
3
3
3
.
6
9
5
4
.
1
9
5
4
.
4
9
7
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
S
t
a
g
e
-
0
.
1
5
7
1
.
8
2
0
-
0
.
1
3
8
3
.
4
7
1
-
0
.
1
3
4
2
.
0
1
9
-
0
.
1
5
2
1
.
8
6
0
(
0
.
0
0
5
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
8
1
)
*
(
0
.
0
0
4
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
8
)
*
*
*
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
p
.
y
.
-
0
.
2
2
2
1
.
1
2
9
(
0
.
5
2
6
)
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
V
Y
-
0
.
3
3
8
1
.
0
6
6
-
0
.
2
7
6
1
.
0
5
2
-
0
.
2
8
1
1
.
0
9
4
-
0
.
3
0
5
1
.
1
3
3
(
0
.
0
9
9
)
*
(
0
.
1
8
3
)
(
0
.
1
2
2
)
(
0
.
1
4
9
)
G
D
P
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
p
.
y
.
-
0
.
8
9
4
1
.
1
2
2
-
0
.
8
7
0
1
.
1
2
8
-
0
.
9
0
4
1
.
1
6
1
-
0
.
8
6
3
1
.
1
5
6
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
4
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
4
)
*
*
*
P
M
E
o
f
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
0
0
.
1
4
5
1
.
0
5
1
0
.
1
2
8
1
.
0
6
1
0
.
0
9
4
1
.
0
4
6
0
.
1
4
7
1
.
0
5
1
(
0
.
2
0
5
)
(
0
.
2
7
8
)
(
0
.
3
5
0
)
(
0
.
2
0
1
)
V
C
f
u
n
d
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
-
0
.
4
2
4
3
.
5
0
1
(
0
.
1
7
7
)
F
u
n
d
T
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
-
1
.
7
5
5
1
.
8
0
4
-
1
.
1
6
7
1
.
9
8
9
-
1
.
7
4
1
1
.
8
0
6
(
0
.
0
0
3
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
1
5
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
4
)
*
*
*
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
c
e
0
.
3
6
6
1
.
1
3
5
0
.
3
2
7
1
.
1
3
2
0
.
2
3
2
1
.
2
6
5
0
.
3
5
5
1
.
1
9
0
o
f
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
2
7
)
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
*
*
*
T
i
m
i
n
g
T
a
k
e
D
o
w
n
s
3
6
m
t
h
s
-
0
.
0
4
5
1
.
0
7
0
(
0
.
5
9
1
)
N
1
8
2
1
8
2
1
5
2
1
8
2
A
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
R
2
0
.
1
3
4
0
.
0
9
9
0
.
0
9
8
0
.
1
3
1
S
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
3
0
.
0
0
0
P
o
w
e
r
V
a
l
u
e
-
0
.
6
0
0
-
0
.
6
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
-
0
.
6
0
0
L
o
g
-
l
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
-
1
9
6
.
1
9
8
-
1
9
9
.
7
3
7
-
9
7
.
6
5
7
-
1
9
6
.
0
0
8
a
A
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
w
e
u
s
e
t
h
e
P
M
E
,
a
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
t
e
x
t
.
S
t
a
g
e
i
s
a
n
o
r
d
i
n
a
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
w
h
e
r
e
w
e
a
s
s
i
g
n
e
d
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
t
o
f
u
n
d
s
w
i
t
h
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
t
s
t
a
g
e
f
o
c
u
s
:
E
a
r
l
y
S
t
a
g
e
=
0
,
B
a
l
a
n
c
e
d
/
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
ﬁ
e
d
=
1
,
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
/
L
a
t
e
S
t
a
g
e
=
2
,
L
B
O
=
3
a
n
d
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
E
q
u
i
t
y
=
4
.
W
e
a
s
s
u
m
e
t
h
e
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
p
o
l
i
c
y
o
f
a
f
u
n
d
t
o
b
e
t
h
e
r
i
s
k
i
e
r
t
h
e
l
o
w
e
r
t
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
h
i
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
p
.
y
.
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
r
e
t
u
r
n
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
V
Y
i
s
t
h
e
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
.
G
D
P
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
p
.
y
.
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
g
r
o
w
t
h
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
.
P
M
E
o
f
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
0
i
s
t
h
e
P
M
E
o
f
t
h
e
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
o
n
e
e
x
i
s
t
s
,
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
i
t
i
s
s
e
t
t
o
z
e
r
o
.
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
.
V
C
f
u
n
d
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
i
t
i
s
z
e
r
o
.
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
a
r
e
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
.
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
c
e
o
f
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
o
f
t
h
e
V
i
n
t
a
g
e
Y
e
a
r
a
n
d
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
.
T
i
m
i
n
g
T
a
k
e
D
o
w
n
s
3
6
m
t
h
s
i
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
t
o
t
h
e
d
e
ﬁ
n
i
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
b
y
N
o
w
a
k
,
K
n
i
g
g
e
,
a
n
d
S
c
h
m
i
d
t
(
2
0
0
4
,
p
.
1
2
n
.
)
.
T
h
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
s
u
p
p
o
s
e
d
t
o
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
t
h
e
t
i
m
i
n
g
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
.
T
h
e
w
e
i
g
h
t
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
t
o
e
a
c
h
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
S
i
z
e
P
o
w
e
r
V
a
l
u
e
.
W
e
u
s
e
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
t
o
d
e
n
o
t
e
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
1
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
0
%
l
e
v
e
l
(
t
w
o
-
s
i
d
e
d
)
.
33T
a
b
l
e
1
5
:
B
o
o
t
s
t
r
a
p
W
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
o
n
f
u
n
d
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
:
I
R
R
a
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
S
a
m
p
l
e
I
,
2
0
0
F
u
n
d
s
)
a
S
a
m
p
l
e
I
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
I
R
R
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
0
.
6
8
2
6
*
*
*
0
.
6
1
3
0
*
*
*
0
.
7
5
8
8
*
*
*
0
.
8
8
7
7
*
*
*
0
.
7
4
9
9
*
*
*
1
.
0
1
7
4
*
*
*
S
t
a
g
e
-
0
.
1
1
4
9
-
0
.
0
1
8
3
-
0
.
0
2
0
1
-
0
.
0
1
6
0
-
0
.
0
2
3
5
-
0
.
0
2
9
1
*
*
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
p
.
y
.
-
0
.
4
8
9
7
-
0
.
0
6
3
8
-
0
.
1
0
1
9
-
0
.
1
2
2
3
-
0
.
1
2
9
5
-
0
.
1
4
7
3
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
V
Y
-
0
.
0
8
8
7
-
0
.
0
8
4
0
-
0
.
0
9
3
7
-
0
.
1
0
8
4
*
*
-
0
.
0
9
9
5
*
-
0
.
1
0
6
5
*
G
D
P
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
p
.
y
.
-
0
.
1
7
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
6
3
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
6
9
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
0
1
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
8
0
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
2
4
2
*
*
*
I
R
R
o
f
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
0
0
.
4
2
5
7
*
0
.
3
8
7
1
*
0
.
4
4
9
7
*
0
.
4
1
7
5
0
.
4
0
2
6
*
0
.
4
1
6
5
*
V
C
f
u
n
d
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
-
0
.
1
3
7
4
*
*
-
0
.
1
4
3
6
*
*
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
-
0
.
2
5
8
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
1
8
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
0
3
0
*
*
-
0
.
3
7
3
8
*
*
*
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
0
.
0
4
2
3
*
*
*
0
.
0
3
4
3
*
0
.
0
3
5
6
*
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
c
e
o
f
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
0
.
0
5
2
4
0
.
0
2
7
8
0
.
0
6
9
4
T
i
m
i
n
g
T
a
k
e
D
o
w
n
s
3
6
m
t
h
s
-
0
.
0
3
3
5
*
-
0
.
0
3
4
2
N
1
9
0
1
9
0
1
5
8
1
8
2
1
8
2
1
5
2
#
o
f
b
o
o
t
s
t
r
a
p
s
a
m
p
l
e
s
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
P
o
w
e
r
V
a
l
u
e
-
0
.
1
0
-
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
0
-
0
.
2
0
-
0
.
2
0
0
.
0
0
a
H
e
r
e
w
e
u
s
e
a
b
o
o
t
s
t
r
a
p
W
L
S
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
w
i
t
h
1
’
0
0
0
r
a
n
d
o
m
r
e
s
a
m
p
l
i
n
g
s
o
f
t
h
e
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
.
F
o
r
a
n
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
i
n
t
h
i
s
m
e
t
h
o
d
c
f
.
M
a
c
K
i
n
n
o
n
(
2
0
0
2
)
.
N
u
m
b
e
r
i
n
g
o
f
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
r
e
f
e
r
t
o
t
a
b
l
e
1
1
.
A
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
w
e
u
s
e
t
h
e
I
R
R
,
a
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
t
e
x
t
.
S
t
a
g
e
i
s
a
n
o
r
d
i
n
a
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
w
h
e
r
e
w
e
a
s
s
i
g
n
e
d
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
t
o
f
u
n
d
s
w
i
t
h
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
t
s
t
a
g
e
f
o
c
u
s
:
E
a
r
l
y
S
t
a
g
e
=
0
,
B
a
l
a
n
c
e
d
/
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
ﬁ
e
d
=
1
,
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
/
L
a
t
e
S
t
a
g
e
=
2
,
L
B
O
=
3
a
n
d
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
E
q
u
i
t
y
=
4
.
W
e
a
s
s
u
m
e
t
h
e
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
p
o
l
i
c
y
o
f
a
f
u
n
d
t
o
b
e
t
h
e
r
i
s
k
i
e
r
t
h
e
l
o
w
e
r
t
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
h
i
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
p
.
y
.
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
r
e
t
u
r
n
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
V
Y
i
s
t
h
e
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
.
G
D
P
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
p
.
y
.
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
g
r
o
w
t
h
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
.
I
R
R
o
f
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
0
i
s
t
h
e
I
R
R
o
f
t
h
e
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
o
n
e
e
x
i
s
t
s
,
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
i
t
i
s
s
e
t
t
o
z
e
r
o
.
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
.
V
C
f
u
n
d
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
i
t
i
s
z
e
r
o
.
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
a
r
e
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
.
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
c
e
o
f
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
o
f
t
h
e
V
i
n
t
a
g
e
Y
e
a
r
a
n
d
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
.
T
i
m
i
n
g
T
a
k
e
D
o
w
n
s
3
6
m
t
h
s
i
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
t
o
t
h
e
d
e
ﬁ
n
i
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
b
y
N
o
w
a
k
,
K
n
i
g
g
e
,
a
n
d
S
c
h
m
i
d
t
(
2
0
0
4
,
p
.
1
2
n
.
)
.
T
h
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
s
u
p
p
o
s
e
d
t
o
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
t
h
e
t
i
m
i
n
g
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
.
T
h
e
w
e
i
g
h
t
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
t
o
e
a
c
h
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
S
i
z
e
P
o
w
e
r
V
a
l
u
e
.
W
e
u
s
e
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
t
o
d
e
n
o
t
e
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
1
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
0
%
l
e
v
e
l
(
t
w
o
-
s
i
d
e
d
)
.
34T
a
b
l
e
1
6
:
B
o
o
t
s
t
r
a
p
W
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
o
n
f
u
n
d
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
:
E
x
c
e
s
s
-
I
R
R
a
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
S
a
m
p
l
e
I
,
2
0
0
F
u
n
d
s
)
a
S
a
m
p
l
e
I
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
E
x
c
e
s
s
-
I
R
R
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
0
.
5
3
6
7
*
*
*
0
.
4
6
1
4
*
*
0
.
6
1
9
9
*
*
*
0
.
8
9
2
3
*
*
*
0
.
7
3
6
9
*
*
*
1
.
0
5
7
6
*
*
*
S
t
a
g
e
-
0
.
0
1
2
4
-
0
.
0
2
0
1
-
0
.
0
2
1
1
-
0
.
0
2
5
6
*
-
0
.
0
3
5
0
*
-
0
.
0
3
7
8
*
*
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
p
.
y
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
V
Y
-
0
.
1
0
4
4
*
-
0
.
1
0
7
2
*
*
-
0
.
1
1
7
9
*
-
0
.
1
7
2
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
6
1
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
6
1
7
*
*
G
D
P
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
p
.
y
.
-
0
.
1
6
3
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
5
6
9
*
*
-
0
.
1
7
4
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
3
0
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
0
9
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
7
5
4
*
*
*
I
R
R
o
f
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
0
0
.
4
2
1
6
*
0
.
3
6
9
1
*
0
.
4
2
6
0
*
0
.
3
5
4
3
0
.
3
3
6
6
0
.
3
4
2
9
V
C
f
u
n
d
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
-
0
.
1
4
1
6
*
*
-
0
.
1
7
4
7
*
*
*
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
-
0
.
2
7
0
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
2
7
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
5
2
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
0
1
3
*
*
*
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
0
.
0
6
3
8
*
*
*
0
.
0
5
5
7
*
*
*
0
.
0
6
1
4
*
*
*
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
c
e
o
f
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
0
.
0
8
3
2
*
0
.
0
6
2
2
0
.
1
1
4
3
*
*
T
i
m
i
n
g
T
a
k
e
D
o
w
n
s
3
6
m
t
h
s
-
0
.
0
2
5
4
-
0
.
0
2
1
6
N
1
9
0
1
9
0
1
5
8
1
8
2
1
8
2
1
5
2
#
o
f
b
o
o
t
s
t
r
a
p
s
a
m
p
l
e
s
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
P
o
w
e
r
V
a
l
u
e
-
0
.
1
0
-
0
.
1
0
0
.
1
0
-
0
.
2
0
-
0
.
2
0
0
.
0
0
a
H
e
r
e
w
e
u
s
e
a
b
o
o
t
s
t
r
a
p
W
L
S
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
w
i
t
h
1
’
0
0
0
r
a
n
d
o
m
r
e
s
a
m
p
l
i
n
g
s
o
f
t
h
e
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
.
F
o
r
a
n
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
i
n
t
h
i
s
m
e
t
h
o
d
c
f
.
M
a
c
K
i
n
n
o
n
(
2
0
0
2
)
.
N
u
m
b
e
r
i
n
g
o
f
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
r
e
f
e
r
t
o
t
a
b
l
e
1
2
.
A
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
w
e
u
s
e
t
h
e
E
x
c
e
s
s
-
I
R
R
,
a
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
t
e
x
t
.
S
t
a
g
e
i
s
a
n
o
r
d
i
n
a
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
w
h
e
r
e
w
e
a
s
s
i
g
n
e
d
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
t
o
f
u
n
d
s
w
i
t
h
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
t
s
t
a
g
e
f
o
c
u
s
:
E
a
r
l
y
S
t
a
g
e
=
0
,
B
a
l
a
n
c
e
d
/
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
ﬁ
e
d
=
1
,
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
/
L
a
t
e
S
t
a
g
e
=
2
,
L
B
O
=
3
a
n
d
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
E
q
u
i
t
y
=
4
.
W
e
a
s
s
u
m
e
t
h
e
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
p
o
l
i
c
y
o
f
a
f
u
n
d
t
o
b
e
t
h
e
r
i
s
k
i
e
r
t
h
e
l
o
w
e
r
t
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
h
i
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
p
.
y
.
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
r
e
t
u
r
n
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
V
Y
i
s
t
h
e
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
.
G
D
P
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
p
.
y
.
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
g
r
o
w
t
h
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
.
I
R
R
o
f
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
0
i
s
t
h
e
I
R
R
o
f
t
h
e
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
o
n
e
e
x
i
s
t
s
,
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
i
t
i
s
s
e
t
t
o
z
e
r
o
.
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
.
V
C
f
u
n
d
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
i
t
i
s
z
e
r
o
.
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
a
r
e
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
.
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
c
e
o
f
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
o
f
t
h
e
V
i
n
t
a
g
e
Y
e
a
r
a
n
d
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
.
T
i
m
i
n
g
T
a
k
e
D
o
w
n
s
3
6
m
t
h
s
i
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
t
o
t
h
e
d
e
ﬁ
n
i
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
b
y
N
o
w
a
k
,
K
n
i
g
g
e
,
a
n
d
S
c
h
m
i
d
t
(
2
0
0
4
,
p
.
1
2
n
.
)
.
T
h
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
s
u
p
p
o
s
e
d
t
o
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
t
h
e
t
i
m
i
n
g
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
.
T
h
e
w
e
i
g
h
t
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
t
o
e
a
c
h
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
S
i
z
e
P
o
w
e
r
V
a
l
u
e
.
W
e
u
s
e
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
t
o
d
e
n
o
t
e
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
1
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
0
%
l
e
v
e
l
(
t
w
o
-
s
i
d
e
d
)
.
35T
a
b
l
e
1
7
:
B
o
o
t
s
t
r
a
p
W
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
o
n
f
u
n
d
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
:
P
M
E
a
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
(
S
a
m
p
l
e
I
,
2
0
0
F
u
n
d
s
)
a
S
a
m
p
l
e
I
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
P
M
E
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
2
.
9
4
0
0
*
*
*
2
.
4
5
8
8
*
*
*
3
.
6
4
9
9
*
*
*
2
.
9
2
9
0
*
*
*
3
.
8
0
7
0
*
*
*
3
.
0
3
7
1
*
*
*
4
.
6
4
1
0
*
*
*
2
.
9
0
0
1
S
t
a
g
e
-
0
.
0
6
3
2
-
0
.
0
4
4
4
-
0
.
0
9
5
0
-
0
.
0
4
7
2
-
0
.
0
9
6
9
*
-
0
.
0
7
5
2
-
0
.
1
4
3
2
*
*
0
.
0
3
5
4
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
p
.
y
.
-
0
.
3
8
9
6
-
1
.
5
6
6
0
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
V
Y
-
0
.
3
0
6
5
-
0
.
3
1
8
7
-
0
.
4
1
2
8
*
*
-
0
.
2
4
4
3
-
0
.
4
2
2
8
*
-
0
.
4
0
8
7
*
*
-
0
.
4
7
9
5
*
*
-
0
.
2
4
3
7
G
D
P
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
p
.
y
.
-
0
.
5
8
8
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
5
5
5
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
7
8
4
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
5
5
0
5
*
-
0
.
7
1
2
4
*
*
-
0
.
6
3
9
7
*
*
*
-
1
.
0
0
1
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
3
2
8
P
M
E
o
f
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
0
-
0
.
0
5
9
2
-
0
.
0
7
5
5
0
.
0
1
1
7
-
0
.
0
6
1
5
-
0
.
0
4
2
9
-
0
.
0
4
1
9
0
.
0
1
8
9
-
0
.
1
3
0
7
V
C
f
u
n
d
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
-
0
.
3
2
5
7
-
0
.
3
7
1
9
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
-
1
.
0
1
9
7
*
*
*
-
1
.
1
2
3
8
*
*
-
0
.
9
1
5
5
*
*
-
1
.
3
2
8
3
*
*
*
-
1
.
3
6
8
9
*
*
*
-
1
.
1
0
3
2
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
0
.
1
7
3
8
*
*
*
0
.
1
4
4
5
*
*
*
0
.
1
2
1
9
*
*
0
.
1
3
9
2
*
*
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
c
e
o
f
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
0
.
1
0
9
4
0
.
0
0
6
4
0
.
2
5
0
8
*
*
0
.
1
0
2
9
T
i
m
i
n
g
T
a
k
e
D
o
w
n
s
3
6
m
t
h
s
-
0
.
0
4
5
1
-
0
.
0
2
4
8
N
1
9
0
1
9
0
1
5
8
1
8
2
1
8
2
1
8
2
1
5
2
1
8
2
#
o
f
b
o
o
t
s
t
r
a
p
s
a
m
p
l
e
s
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
P
o
w
e
r
V
a
l
u
e
-
0
.
5
0
-
0
.
5
0
0
.
0
0
-
0
.
5
0
-
0
.
6
0
-
0
.
6
0
0
.
0
0
-
0
.
6
0
a
H
e
r
e
w
e
u
s
e
a
b
o
o
t
s
t
r
a
p
W
L
S
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
w
i
t
h
1
’
0
0
0
r
a
n
d
o
m
r
e
s
a
m
p
l
i
n
g
s
o
f
t
h
e
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
.
F
o
r
a
n
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
i
n
t
h
i
s
m
e
t
h
o
d
c
f
.
M
a
c
K
i
n
n
o
n
(
2
0
0
2
)
.
N
u
m
b
e
r
i
n
g
o
f
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
r
e
f
e
r
t
o
t
a
b
l
e
1
3
a
n
d
1
4
.
A
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
w
e
u
s
e
t
h
e
P
M
E
,
a
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
t
e
x
t
.
S
t
a
g
e
i
s
a
n
o
r
d
i
n
a
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
w
h
e
r
e
w
e
a
s
s
i
g
n
e
d
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
t
o
f
u
n
d
s
w
i
t
h
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
t
s
t
a
g
e
f
o
c
u
s
:
E
a
r
l
y
S
t
a
g
e
=
0
,
B
a
l
a
n
c
e
d
/
D
i
v
e
r
s
i
ﬁ
e
d
=
1
,
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
/
L
a
t
e
S
t
a
g
e
=
2
,
L
B
O
=
3
a
n
d
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
E
q
u
i
t
y
=
4
.
W
e
a
s
s
u
m
e
t
h
e
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
p
o
l
i
c
y
o
f
a
f
u
n
d
t
o
b
e
t
h
e
r
i
s
k
i
e
r
t
h
e
l
o
w
e
r
t
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
h
i
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
p
.
y
.
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
r
e
t
u
r
n
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
.
M
S
C
I
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
V
Y
i
s
t
h
e
r
e
t
u
r
n
i
n
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
.
G
D
P
g
r
o
w
t
h
r
a
t
e
p
.
y
.
i
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
g
r
o
w
t
h
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
.
P
M
E
o
f
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
0
i
s
t
h
e
P
M
E
o
f
t
h
e
p
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
o
n
e
e
x
i
s
t
s
,
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
i
t
i
s
s
e
t
t
o
z
e
r
o
.
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
.
V
C
f
u
n
d
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
i
s
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
f
u
n
d
,
e
l
s
e
i
t
i
s
z
e
r
o
.
F
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
a
r
e
t
o
t
a
l
f
u
n
d
s
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
t
o
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
i
n
t
a
g
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
,
i
f
i
t
i
s
a
V
C
(
B
O
)
f
u
n
d
.
A
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
d
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
c
e
o
f
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
t
y
p
e
i
n
ﬂ
o
w
o
f
t
h
e
V
i
n
t
a
g
e
Y
e
a
r
a
n
d
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
.
T
i
m
i
n
g
T
a
k
e
D
o
w
n
s
3
6
m
t
h
s
i
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
t
o
t
h
e
d
e
ﬁ
n
i
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
b
y
N
o
w
a
k
,
K
n
i
g
g
e
,
a
n
d
S
c
h
m
i
d
t
(
2
0
0
4
,
p
.
1
2
n
.
)
.
T
h
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
s
u
p
p
o
s
e
d
t
o
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
t
h
e
t
i
m
i
n
g
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
f
u
n
d
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
.
T
h
e
w
e
i
g
h
t
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
t
o
e
a
c
h
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
S
i
z
e
P
o
w
e
r
V
a
l
u
e
.
W
e
u
s
e
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
t
o
d
e
n
o
t
e
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
1
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
0
%
l
e
v
e
l
(
t
w
o
-
s
i
d
e
d
)
.
36